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Inuit strategies for greater self determination are 
taking various approaches to the issue of sover-
eignty. Whereas the Inuit Circumpolar Confer-
ence (ICC) seeks to partly transcend the West-
phalian imaginary the Greenlandic self rule 
government is largely embracing it. 
Introduction 
Th ere is no doubt that the issue of sovereignty in the 
Arctic has become a topic of increased interest in the 
last few years as Northern states come to grips with the 
challenges and opportunities posed by a rapidly warm-
ing Arctic region. Processes of state territorialization in 
the Arctic have, in turn, placed the Inuit, who are the 
predominant indigenous inhabitants of the Far North, 
on a defensive footing. Th is article considers, fi rst, how 
the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) has responded 
by issuing a Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty, in which 
it questions the right of any state to claim privileged sta-
tus in the Arctic without incorporating the interests and 
rights of the Inuit people. Interestingly, representatives of 
the Greenlandic self rule government, which represents 
the primarily Inuit population of Greenland, has taken 
a somewhat diff erent tack. Th e article therefore proceeds 
to analyze how – although sympathetic to the ICC’s con-
cerns – Greenlandic politicians are taking a much more 
traditional approach to the issue of sovereignty as they 
begin to envision the possibility of a future, sovereign 
“Inuit state”. A rift is hence uncovered in the way that 
Inuit identity and sovereignty are conceived by the ICC 
and the Greenlandic self rule government. Th e paper con-
cludes by considering the possible impact of an independ-
ent Greenland on the future of Inuit self-determination 
more generally.
Before delving into the diff erences in the sovereignty 
positions held by the ICC and the Greenlandic self rule 
government, it behooves us to understand the theoreti-
cal limitations, and the inherent slipperiness, of the very 
notion of sovereignty itself. Traditionally, the concept 
of sovereignty can be understood as the territorial or-
ganization of political authority, often traced back to the 
purported roots of nation-state formation, the Treaty 
of Westphalia (Boucher 1998; Gross 1947; Morgenthau 
1985; for a critique see Osiander 2001). Subsequent inter-
national relations (IR) theory, particularly the dominant 
realist school, has maintained the sovereign, territorial 
state as the unproblematized starting point of any analy-
ses of the world political order. In the case of realism 
(Bull 1977; Mersheimer 2001; Morgenthau 1985; Waltz 
1979) the state is seen as a clearly defi ned and bounded 
actor, pursuing specifi c state interests within an otherwise 
anarchic world of similar state actors. Despite neoliberal 
(Keohane 1984; Keohane & Nye 1977) and constructiv-
ist (Katzenstein 1996; Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992) attempts 
to question the reifi cation of the state entity, downplay 
the assumed anarchic global context, and infuse values 
into state behavior, there is little doubt that actual state-
craft still remains very much gripped by the key assump-
tion that the world is ultimately governed by the dynam-
ics of self interested sovereign states in competition with 
each other.
The Inuit and Sovereignty: 
The Case of the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference 
and Greenland
Hannes Gerhardt Assistant Professor, PhD, Department of Geosciences, University of West 
Georgia, 1601 maple Street, Carrollton, GA 30118, Email: hgerhard@westga.edu.
HANNES GERHARDT TEMA 7
Even with the strong presence of realism, however, 
and hence a heavily leaning Westphalian geographical 
imaginary, IR theorists and state actors have begun to 
recognize the many challenges posed to the assumed 
overlap between political authority and territory by an 
increasingly interconnected and globalized world (Ag-
new 1994; Elden 2005; Keohane and Nye 2000; Krasner 
2001; Rosenau 1995). Stephen Krasner breaks these con-
cerns down by identifying four diff erent components of 
sovereignty: 1) the ability to “regulate the movement of 
goods, capital, people, and ideas” across national borders, 
2) the capacity to exert eff ective domestic control over 
sovereign territory, 3) the achievement of legal recogni-
tion by other states, and 4) the capability to function au-
tonomously, without “authoritative external infl uences” 
(Krasner 2001, 2). Krasner’s criteria for territorial sover-
eignty, however, are becoming ever more problematic.1 
Th e movement of practically everything is becoming 
increasingly transnationalized and deregulated; the lack 
of control over these transnational fl ows is subsequently 
leading to compromised “domestic” security, which, in 
turn, helps fuel the emerging discourse within transna-
tional governmental institutions seeking to develop the 
concept of “conditional” sovereignty (Elden 2006). 
Connected to these nascent limitations on sover-
eignty, it is practically impossible in this day and age 
for a state to be able to function truly autonomously; 
important decisions made at home will be impacted by 
a whole host of non-state political and economic actors 
– both domestic and international in origin – that super-
sede the pure interests and will of the state. It is precisely 
the actuality of such a compromised autonomy that has 
led the geographer John Agnew (2005) to propose the 
existence of non-territorial sovereignty regimes, in which 
lesser, supposedly “sovereign” states are absorbed into the 
transborder sovereignty regime of a hegemonic state, such 
as the U.S., or a supranational entity, such as the E.U. 
In this sense, the U.S. or the E.U. manage to control 
the political-economic context within which lesser states 
function, thereby imposing a pre-given structure within 
which state decision making must occur. Th ese hegem-
onic regimes, however, must also be seen as not fully 
autonomous, as they compete with each other. 
Th e above mentioned conditions facing the institu-
tion of sovereignty have encouraged new and diff erent 
ways of conceptualizing political authority more gener-
ally, for instance, postulating such authority as being 
inherently shared (and hence constructed), intertwined 
or rhizomatic (based on the work of Deleuze & Guatarri 
1987), diff used (for instance within governmentality ap-
proaches inspired by Foucault 1991), and less top-down 
or non-scalar (for instance Marston et al 2005). A par-
ticularly interesting contribution in this regard has been 
the work of Jessica Shadian (2010), who has proposed a 
non-state form of sovereignty based on the case of the 
Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) (also see Shaw 
2008; Zellen 2008). Shadian writes, “Inuit sovereignty is 
not ‘located’ in the form of a territorially bound state or 
even in local Inuit governments … Rather, sovereignty 
is located in the processes … such as relations between 
Inuit physical ties to the Arctic land and the role of the 
ICC in the international community (2010, 494-495). 
Shadian hence is suggesting the emergence of new politi-
cal spaces, brought about through intensive institutional 
interactions, that are leading to real non-state power, 
and thus “sovereignty”. Shadian goes on to argue that 
the emergence of non-state sovereignty in the Arctic is 
predicated on a suprastate Inuit nationalism that gains its 
legitimacy via a mythically grounded idea of the Inuit as 
indigenous stewards of the circumpolar region they call 
home (also see Beier 2009; Loukacheva 2007). 
Th e rest of this paper will seek to further explore 
this question of Inuit sovereignty and identity. Follow-
ing the discourse of the ICC, it will be argued that, in 
line with Shadian, the mobilization and direction of the 
ICC represents a departure from traditional concepts of 
territorial, state based sovereignty. Nevertheless, I also 
contend that the ICC is not declaring an all out attack on 
the still very present Westphalian imaginary held by key 
state actors. Indeed, the ICC is seen here as strategically 
placing itself both inside and outside of this dominant 
imaginary. Th e paper further parts ways with the vision 
of a unifi ed Inuit strategy to rethink the classic concept 
of a state-based territorial sovereignty when considering 
the case of Greenland. It will be argued that the self rule 
government of Greenland, unlike the ICC, is much more 
focused on a bounded Greenlandic nation as opposed 
to a suprastate Inuit one (see Nuttall 2008 for a related 
argument). Directly linked to this divergent focus, the 
Greenlandic government must be recognized as main-
taining a more traditional Westphalian approach to the 
issue of Arctic governance as it attempts to translate its 
perceived right to exercise full control over its future to 
the actual power to do so. 
Th e ICC and sovereignty 
In the last few years Northern states have been quick to 
shift their foreign policy imperatives to more fully ad-
dress Arctic governance issues. Th e coastal Arctic states 
–  Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, and Den-
mark – have taken a particularly keen interest in the re-
gion, seeking to expand their sovereign reach by using the 
provisions of the U.N. Law of the Sea to make territorial 
claims beyond the 200 nautical miles of their coastline. 
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Accompanying the cumbersome process of proving such 
claims, these states, often referred to as the Arctic Five, 
have also begun to engage in a range of practices and 
discourses intended to solidify their position in the region 
(Anderson 2009; Byers 2009). Th ese activities include 
an increase in military maneuvers, fast-tracking heavily 
funded Polar research, and holding summits and other 
meetings in which a discursive framework is created that 
seeks to solidify the preeminent position of the Arctic 
Five within the polar North. 
Th e fi rst summit to be held by the Arctic Five oc-
curred in 2008, in Ilulissat Greenland. At this gathering 
the fi ve Arctic coastal states offi  cially declared their own 
particular relevance for Arctic governance, based prima-
rily on their legally sedimented land/water claims in the 
region. Th e Ilulissat declaration was immediately viewed 
with skepticism by non-invited Arctic stakeholders such 
as the ICC and non-coastal Nordic states. It is in response 
to this meeting that the ICC issued its own Declaration 
on Sovereignty in the Arctic (ICC 2009). In this docu-
ment the ICC does not engage in a full fl edged dismissal 
of the concept and institution of state sovereignty, but it 
does question the simplicity and matter of factness that 
is often assumed when issues of sovereignty emerge. Th e 
ICC’s main objective in this critical stance is ultimately 
to insert the Inuit people as an integral component of any 
possible sovereignty arrangement in the Arctic. Key ICC 
demands have thus included entitlement claims to greater 
autonomy by creating indigenously controlled local and 
regional political institutions; the right to participate in 
national decision making as it pertains to both the devel-
opment and, increasingly, the foreign aff airs relevant to 
the region; and, lastly, the right to own and control the 
land/water and the resources on which the Inuit reside. 
Th e Inuit via the ICC have pursued these aims diff er-
ently within the diff erent state systems in which they live 
(see Loukacheva). In Greenland the Inuit have succeeded 
in establishing a self-rule government, which has given 
them a great deal of political autonomy from Denmark, 
full control over their resources, and international rec-
ognition. In Canada and the U.S. the Inuit have entered 
into signifi cant land claim agreements that serve as the 
“key building blocks” for furthering Inuit rights (ICC 
2009). In these areas, however, indigenously run insti-
tutions, which have adopted Western models, are still 
not fully developed and empowered (see, for example, 
Légaré); control over resources is still contested; and fed-
eral laws, as well as foreign policy, continue to impact 
these Inuit lands with restricted input from the Inuit 
leadership. Finally, the Inuit of Chukotka, Russia have 
made only minimal gains in terms of establishing greater 
autonomy and self-governance, although their cause is 
now on the political radar in Moscow.
In dealing with the above challenges the ICC tends to 
present the Inuit multifariously as a people with universal 
human rights, as citizens with defi ned state sponsored 
rights, and as an indigenous people with specifi c rights 
within these states. It is the emphasis on the Inuit as a dis-
tinct people, over and beyond their status as citizens, that 
places the ICC at potential odds with the state (Corntas-
sel & Primeau 1995). Resorting to language present in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and, to an even larger degree, the United Nations Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the ICC 
repeatedly has made claims to the Inuit’s right to “self 
determination”, which includes the assertion of the Inuit’s 
right to claim their own “political status”. For the most 
part, however, the ICC has shied away from making any 
claims that directly refute the sovereignty of the state 
in which they reside. In this sense, self determination 
is largely presented as the right to cultural integrity and 
empowerment linked to the specifi c demands mentioned 
above (Corntassel & Primeau 1995; Shadian 2010; Lou-
kacheva 2007).
With regard to the issue of state sovereignty, then, 
the ICC’s Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic ends 
up taking a dual approach, on the one hand questioning 
its contemporary authority, and on the other, pointing to 
the integral role that the Inuit play in its execution in the 
polar North. Hence, the Declaration proceeds to point 
to the “contested nature” of the concept of sovereignty 
and to highlight the lack of any fi xed meaning that the 
term may hold. Furthermore, the Declaration points to 
overlapping and federally divided sovereignties as well 
as alternative “models of governance”. I suggest that the 
ICC is here overtly problematizing a hierarchically organ-
ized scalar understanding of sovereignty in which sover-
eign authority is seen as vested in scales via an assortment 
of institutionalized apparatuses. In pushing back against 
such a view the ICC emphasizes a way of being in the 
world that refl ects what Marston et al. (2005) refer to as 
a “fl at” ontology in which the scalar political organization 
of territory is seen as a dubious trope that hides the reality 
of a complex, ever-changing interaction of intertwined 
sites. Hence, by positioning themselves as integrally fused 
with the Arctic’s land, sea and ice, the Inuit indirectly 
question the privileged status of distant capitals to exert 
their power over the Arctic region. 
In this sense, the Inuit are working to establish them-
selves as having rights and claims that exist over and 
beyond what they indirectly present as the synthetic con-
struct of sovereignty. Or, alternatively, as Jessica Shadian 
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(2010) argues, the Inuit are embodying a diff erent, non-
state form of sovereignty. Following Shadian (2010), the 
Inuit via the ICC are essentially attempting a shift in con-
sciousness in which the territorial, state-based conception 
of sovereignty is fundamentally rethought. Th e ICC is 
here seen as working towards such an aim by fostering 
a more cooperative and embracing form of governance 
that supersedes the Westphalian state-centered approach.
In this regard the Arctic Council becomes an impor-
tant model as the Inuit are given nearly equal representa-
tion to that of the key Arctic states, maintaining the sta-
tus of permanent participants.2 Beyond this international 
work, however, the ICC is also seeking a more signifi cant 
place at the table within national decision making, in-
cluding the realm of foreign aff airs. Using the Draft Nor-
dic Saami Convention as a model, the demand for local 
actors to have a substantive say in foreign aff airs decisions 
is a direct challenge to the clear hierarchical top-down 
imaginary of autonomous sovereignty (Koivurova 2010). 
Hence, both internationally and domestically, the ICC 
has been able to position itself as an integral actor in 
the Arctic, signifi cantly contributing to the discourses 
employed in the ongoing decision making processes that 
are shaping the Arctic region’s future. 
Nevertheless, regardless of whether state sovereignty 
is viewed as an ontological fi ction or not, there is no 
doubt that it does still exist in the minds of statesmen 
and members of critical international institutions such 
as the U.N. Hence, borders are drawn, jurisdictions are 
mapped out, and power is subsequently projected on the 
basis of these constructions. Furthermore, the political 
imaginaries that the ICC favors, sedimented in a number 
of U.N. Declarations and other Conventions, has until 
now been largely questioned if not fl atly rejected by a 
number of powerful states, much to the dismay of the 
ICC. Th e United States, for instance, has yet to ratify the 
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
and Canada has only just recently signed it. It is with 
regard to this reality that the ICC has also woven into 
its Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic a further 
layer of meaning that seeks to sediment the import of the 
Inuit people within a more traditional, state-centered and 
hierarchical system of territorial sovereignty.
 It is particularly with regard to Krasner’s second 
point on sovereignty, the ability to exert eff ective control 
over a territory, that the ICC positions the Inuit as inte-
gral players within any state-centered approach to claim-
ing sovereign rights over the Arctic. Having a history 
of being used as pawns in state sovereignty claims that 
have hinged on suffi  cient occupation of land (Tester & 
Kulchyski 1994, also see Shadian 2007), the ICC has 
carefully crafted its unique position into a demand for 
greater representation within any state centric approaches 
to Arctic decision making. As the ICC Declaration on 
Sovereignty in the Arctic states, “Th e foundation, projec-
tion and enjoyment of Arctic sovereignty and sovereign 
rights all require healthy and sustainable communities in 
the Arctic. In this sense, ‘sovereignty begins at home’” 
(ICC 2009). In other words, the ICC is making clear that 
any state based sovereignty claims that may be made ulti-
mately depend on the presence of functioning habitation 
in these regions, and this habitation is provided fi rst and 
foremost by the Inuit. Furthermore, to make this habita-
tion successful, and to enable it as a foundational pillar 
of sovereignty claims, it needs to be supported through 
eff ective governance. 
Hence, with regard to preexisting and stubborn con-
ceptions of territorial, state based sovereignty, the ICC’s 
central point is that state based sovereign control of the 
far fl ung territories of the Arctic can only occur with 
the incorporation and respect of the Inuit’s customs and 
their region-specifi c knowledge (Loukacheva 2007; Beier 
2009). In this way, even if the more radical departures 
from the traditional Westphalian state-centered system 
are circumvented by the Arctic rim states in their scram-
ble to lay claim on the Arctic, the ICC still manages to 
place the Inuit people as pivotal and integral players in 
this process. (see Shadian 2010 for a similar conclusion).3 
Th e Greenlandic vision of an “Inuit State” 
Th e issue of Inuit sovereignty takes on a rather diff erent 
form from that off ered by the ICC when considering the 
case of Greenland. Greenland achieved home rule from 
Denmark in 1979, which, for the time, provided signifi -
cant autonomy to the Greenlanders, the large majority 
of whom are Inuit. Yet, in 2008, Greenland voted in a 
referendum to expand the autonomy laid out in the home 
rule regime. Th e subsequent Act on Greenland Self Rule 
essentially achieves the aims of self determination as out-
lined in the ICC’s Declaration on Sovereignty, however, 
with a signifi cant diff erence; in the case of Greenland, self 
rule is squarely placed on the Greenlandic people, who in 
no way are defi ned on the basis of their ethnic or indig-
enous character. Th e Act includes 1) the recognition of 
Greenlanders as a distinct people under international law; 
2) the further empowerment of a Greenlandic govern-
ment, both executive and legislative, with expanded ju-
risdiction over the Greenlandic police and courts; 3) full 
rights over the soil and subsoil; and 4) expanded power 
both to conduct foreign aff airs that fall fully within the 
Greenlandic government’s competence (i.e. jurisdiction) 
and to be kept abreast with critical Danish foreign policy 
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decision-making that may have repercussions for Green-
land. 
Despite these achievements, which have been much 
admired by fellow Inuit in the U.S., Canada, and Rus-
sia, the predominately Inuit leadership in Greenland has 
fi xed its gaze on a further, though still distant goal: full 
independence. Th is attitude was often repeated in inter-
views I conducted with Greenlandic government offi  cials 
and other Greenlandic political actors in the summer of 
2010.4 Interestingly, in embracing this position the po-
litical role of the ICC is also seen as signifi cantly dimin-
ished. According to one offi  cial in the Greenlandic execu-
tive, for instance, the ICC’s signifi cance for Greenland is 
essentially that of being an international advocacy group 
responsible for Inuit cultural preservation. Yet, it is the 
Greenlandic government, according to this offi  cial, that 
must strive to achieve greater sovereignty for the Inuit of 
Greenland through the establishment of an independent 
Greenlandic nation-state. Th is view was often repeated in 
various forms in my interviews.  
Th ere are two aspects in this push for independence 
that are particularly relevant. First, the Greenlandic gov-
ernment must be recognized as pursuing a nationalism, or 
Greenlandization, that is distinct, although not necessar-
ily exclusionary of, a broader suprastate Inuit nationalism 
(see Nuttal 1994; 2008). Sejersen, for instance, remarks, 
that this Greenlandization is grounded on the basis of 
Greenlanders “claiming their right as political agents to 
determine their own future rather than on the basis of a 
well-defi ned cultural agenda” (quoted in Nuttal 2008). 
Hence, very much opposed to the mythically grounded 
Inuit nationalism described by Shadian, Greenlandic self 
rule and future independence is based on a discourse of 
public government with no mention made of the Green-
landic Inuit’s traditional connection to the land and sea. 
In this sense, Greenland is not offi  cially recognized as a 
specifi cally “Inuit” region and thus, although an inde-
pendent Greenland would be a de facto Inuit state, its 
legal path to, and recognition of, such a status would not 
actually be based on an Inuit identity as such. 
Th e second and related aspect of a Greenlandic move 
towards independence is that the Greenlandic govern-
ment’s approach to the issue of sovereignty is ultimately 
grounded on an acceptance, even an unquestioned as-
sumption, of the validity of a Westphalian political on-
tology. Th is is not to say that the Greenlandic authorities 
do not recognize how the ICC’s tactics of a circumpolar 
Inuit strategy have helped the Inuit in their respective 
areas promote greater autonomy, yet the idea and the 
subsequent practice of sovereignty persists as an ideal, 
and it does so via the scalar construct of the nation-state. 
Hence, the desire for full sovereignty on the part of the 
Greenlanders can be understood as grounded on a real-
ist inspired belief that full sovereignty means possess-
ing complete command over the laws and rules that are 
instituted, including, it should be noted their exception, 
hence calling forth the Schmittian understanding of sov-
ereignty as the power to determine the state of exception 
(Schmitt 1996).
Consider, for instance, the Th ule Air Force Base, 
which was built by the United States after WWII in 
western Greenland, incidentally forcing the local Inu-
ghuit off  of their land. Faced with Inuit concerns the 
Danes maintained an offi  cial policy of making the island 
a nuclear free zone. Yet clandestinely, in cooperation with 
the U.S., the Danish government condoned using Th ule 
as a transit and storage hub for nuclear weapons (DUPI 
1997). Th is decision was, essentially, the calling of a state 
of exception in which the state usurped its own decree. 
Subsequently, in 1968, long after Greenland had become 
an integral part of the Danish Kingdom, a B-52 bomber 
carrying 5 hydrogen bombs crashed just outside of the 
Th ule base, severely contaminating the area. Th e state of 
exception, executed from Copenhagen on the basis of a 
scaled sovereignty, clearly demonstrates the limits of Inuit 
power within the larger organization of a nation-state in 
which the Inuit remain a clear minority. I contend that it 
is largely with respect to such a realization that the Inuit 
of Greenland seem to deeply crave full independence – to 
be the masters of their own rules and laws. 
Yet the undying drive for greater sovereign control 
is not just rooted in history, it is also based on the still 
dominant political imaginary of a scaled sovereignty that 
is apparent in the scramble to territorialize the Arctic 
today. Not only has state posturing and grandstanding 
increased, for example in the form of augmented military 
maneuvers in the region, but discourses have appeared 
that make a conscious run-around the so called “mosaic 
of cooperation” (Young 2005) that has been meticulously 
built up over the last two decades. Th e Ilulissat Declara-
tion is seen by many as embodying such a move. Inter-
estingly, however, deliberations between the Arctic Five 
in Ilulissat and subsequent summits have included rep-
resentatives from Greenland. Th is is a point that Green-
landic offi  cials frequently drove home in the interviews I 
conducted with them, as well as their frustration at oc-
casionally being left out of the photo ops. Th us, although 
sympathetic to the ICC’s critique of the Ilulissat Decla-
ration, it appears that the Greenlandic government has 
taken its own interest in the sovereignty claims issue as 
formulated by the Arctic Five based on its own potential 
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future as a sovereign state with claims to the continental 
shelf that extends from its shores. 
 Yet, there are a number of critiques that can be made 
of the Greenlandic approach. One is that the adoption of 
the Western political-spatial ontology on which the mar-
riage between sovereignty and territory are based, only 
serves to further cement Western power structures and 
dominance (see Boldt & Long 1985). Certainly, the quest 
for a Greenlandic sovereignty that is squarely grounded 
on a territorially bounded land and culture fl ies in the 
face of Shadian’s depiction of an ICC striving to tran-
scend the Westphalian model via a vision of the world in 
which societies are not viewed as clearly contained within 
a strictly bordered, politically scaled unit. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that the utilization or acceptance of such 
an overly scalar (hierarchical) framework for understand-
ing and executing power, as is found in the Westphalian 
imaginary, can lead to misdirected and ineff ective resist-
ance strategies to that power (Marston et al. 2005). 
Yet, the question then becomes whether the Green-
landic self rule government sees itself as being in the 
process of resisting external dominance, or whether 
they believe, instead, that this dominance can fully be 
overcome once they have joined the privileged club of 
sovereign nations. To throw light on this question we 
must again consider Krasner’s criteria of sovereignty and 
ask whether this coveted status, and all of its perceived 
rewards, can actually be achieved with an independent 
Greenland. Notwithstanding the general limitations to 
sovereignty outlined at the outset of this paper, Green-
land does at fi rst appear relatively well positioned to claim 
sovereign control with independence. Th e outside world, 
for instance, has no reason not to recognize Greenland 
as an independent state, as long as the Danish parlia-
ment approves it, which it appears it would do if that 
were the Greenlanders will. In terms of the movement 
of goods, capital, people, and ideas Greenland already 
exerts signifi cant power, as evidenced by their decision 
not to be a party to EU rules and regulations despite 
Denmark’s membership. Similarly, Greenland has been 
working to impose its own distinctive immigration rules 
intended to specifi cally meet the needs of Greenland’s 
labor market.5 Clearly, with independence, the Greenlan-
dic government’s ability to execute such decisions would 
only be enhanced. Finally, domestic control over Green-
land is primarily challenged by the cost of dealing with 
the distance between its remote inhabited enclaves, yet it 
also has the distinct advantage of maintaining a largely 
homogenous population that off ers very little resistance 
to the legitimacy of the Greenlandic government.
Nevertheless, it is Krasner’s fourth point that is most 
problematic, namely the ability of the state to func-
tion autonomously. Like any state, Greenland’s ability 
to rule over its territory is hampered by the inevitable 
compromises made in the process of plugging the na-
tional economy into the global fl ow of goods and capital. 
Yet in Greenland this compromise is exacerbated by its 
very small population and the underlying weakness of 
its economy. It is explicitly clear to the Greenland self 
rule government that any independence from Denmark 
is predicated on the discovery and subsequent extraction 
of oil and gas off  of the Greenlandic coast. In this respect 
Nutall (2008) has off ered the poignant commentary of 
a Greenlandic government that is paradoxically viewing 
global warming as a boon to its development chances, 
and hence independence, by gaining easier access to car-
bon producing resources that are largely blamed for this 
warming to begin with.
Yet, becoming an oil and gas exporting nation would 
mean a massive restructuring of Greenland’s economy 
and society and this restructuring would be largely driven 
by external competence, norms, and interests. Foreign oil 
companies and the states in which they are headquartered 
would likely gain an increasing stake, and subsequent 
infl uence, in Greenlandic aff airs. As a result, the region 
would undoubtedly gain signifi cantly in geopolitical 
importance and Greenland, with its small population, 
would have to rely almost completely on foreign states for 
security and search and rescue operations. Th e U.S. Air 
Force base in Th ule would likely gain renewed strategic 
importance and may be accompanied by further U.S. 
military installations. Finally, the infl ux of petrodollars 
would plug Greenland into the fi nancial circuit of capital 
centered on the United States and may even bring pres-
sure on Greenland to adopt the Dollar as the country’s 
offi  cial currency. 
Given that a possible oil and gas based economy in 
Greenland would be at least fi fteen years in the future, 
the above scenario remains hypothetical and obviously 
cannot fully take into account the many global political, 
economic, and ecological changes that may take place in 
this time. Yet the point of these considerations is to high-
light the compromised autonomy that Greenland faces 
even with full independence. In this sense John Agnew’s 
point of conceiving sovereignty as non-territorial and 
rather as regimes of power that traverse state boundaries 
is quite helpful. From this perspective Greenland as an 
independent state would not necessarily be fully sover-
eign, rather it would likely fall between the competing 
sovereignty regimes of the U.S.’ globalist hegemony and 
the supranational project of the EU. 
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In the future, Greenland would likely seek the maxi-
mum amount of benefi ts within these power regimes and, 
in the process, would be forced to make decisions that 
will bring about monumental societal transformations. 
In practice such a predicament would mean an eff ort to 
concentrate Inuit populations within towns close to the 
oil and gas infrastructure, while still allowing for signifi -
cant immigration to provide the labor and competence to 
eff ectively run a sophisticated resource extraction econ-
omy. Th e possible consequences of such a transformation 
would be that the Inuit would not only be signifi cantly 
diluted as a percentage of the Greenlandic population, 
but their traditional native culture, based on remote liv-
ing and subsistence hunting, would become signifi cantly 
more diffi  cult to sustain than it already is today. In other 
words, an “Inuit” petrostate and the transformation 
needed to bring it about would in all likelihood lead very 
far away from the cultural integrity that is largely at the 
root of the aims of the ICC and its conception of the 
Inuit’s position with regard to sovereignty. 
Conclusion
How are we then to understand these divergent politi-
cal visions and trajectories in which the Inuit are impli-
cated? I suggest viewing the Greenlandic Inuit leadership 
as pragmatists seeking to maximize their self determina-
tion by playing the dominant political game, which, in 
the end, means adopting its spatial ontology. Th us, as 
a state-centric Westphalian model continues to assert, 
or reassert, itself in the Arctic, the Greenlandic Inuit 
are positioning themselves for a full independence that 
makes the most of this powerful, and arguably overrid-
ing political imaginary. It is possible that the process of 
establishing a Greenlandic state will, as a consequence, 
work to obstruct more counter-hegemonic Inuit strategies 
inspired by a non-Western, indigenous political ontology. 
But such an obstruction is not a given. Th e ICC, for in-
stance, will continue to be skeptical of the ontological 
value of institutionalized state-based sovereignty and they 
will undoubtedly fi nd support from Greenland in their 
demand that Arctic governance requires the weighty in-
put of the Inuit who are residing there. 
Furthermore, Greenlanders may come to recognize 
that statehood does not necessarily equal full sovereignty. 
Over time the Inuit of Greenland will have to come to 
terms with the realization that even with full independ-
ence, a Greenlandic state will be squeezed by powerful 
sovereignty regimes that will not only constrain their de-
cision making powers, but potentially also trump their 
laws. Such realizations may, in turn, lead to a Green-
landic state that becomes a dominant voice in the push 
towards a greater openness to multilateral forms of gov-
ernance in the Arctic, and around the world. 
In the meantime, however, there is little doubt that the 
independence that Greenland seeks, and the subsequent 
economic and societal transformations that this process 
would call forth would irrevocably alter the Greenlandic 
Inuit’s identity and culture. Such a development could be 
bemoaned as an empowerment of the Western dominated 
Westphalian political structure that is deeply implicated 
in the contemporary and historical challenge to the Inu-
it’s cultural preservation. Indeed, the ICC’s struggle over 
the years for self-determination is very much a struggle 
against the hierarchical power structure that has been 
imposed on them. Yet, I contend, that the political path 
taken by the Greenlandic indigenous people is not some-
thing that we, as outsiders, can or should judge.
Greenland was a colony, and even after the institution 
of self rule, has long served as Denmark’s, and Northern 
Europe’s, “other”, a position that the Greenlandic Inuit 
believe can be rectifi ed by achieving independence. Inter-
estingly, the depiction of the Greenlandic Inuit, largely 
facilitated through Knud Rasmussen’s expeditions and 
books, has shifted from one of being a noble savage that 
must be incorporated into the West’s inevitable path to-
wards progress to being a noble native under siege, who 
is in touch with a deeper though endangered spirituality 
and morality that evades the West. Th is latter, contem-
porary trope, as elicited in Peter Hoeg’s well known novel 
Smilla’s Sense for Snow, is, it should be recognized, also a 
form of othering, which, we should note, primarily serves 
to help understand and make sense of ourselves rather 
than the Inuit (Th isted 2002).
It is in light of such a post-colonial insight that we 
ought to be wary of critiquing Greenland’s embrace for 
sovereign statehood. As this process unfolds it will be 
very interesting to see how Greenland’s and the ICC’s 
ambitions evolve and infl uence each other. Th ere will un-
doubtedly be intense discussions and debates as the Inuit 
people continue to defi ne and defend themselves in the 
lands and waters they call home. And for us in the South, 
with an eye to the North, there will certainly be much to 
learn from this exchange.
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Notes
1. It should be noted that Krasner has himself been an important critic 
of the traditional understanding of sovereignty.
2. Although the Arctic Council maintains mostly a policy shaping 
rather than a policy making function, it nonetheless is noteworthy 
that the ICC, along with a number of other Inuit organizations, 
are given the status of permanent participants. Although this sta-
tus does not off er voting rights within the consensus based Arctic 
Council, it nonetheless puts the ICC on nearly equal footing to 
Arctic states in terms of, for example, addressing Arctic Council 
meetings; raising points of order; proposing projects, and being 
consulted on agendas (Arctic Council 2011).
3. An example of this infl uence could be gleaned during one of the la-
test Arctic Rim states meetings in Ottawa, 2010, in which Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton surprised her hosts by insisting on greater 
participation by, and cooperation with, the Inuit (Zellen 2010).
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4. Interviews were conducted in the summer of 2010. Th ese included 
half a dozen formal interviews of government offi  cials, both in the 
executive and legislative branches, and a dozen informal interviews 
of Greenlandic participants and observers at the ICC’s General 
Assembly in Nuuk. I also spoke to several local Nuuk residents. 
Th e selection process was based on prior research into key policy 
making actors and a subsequent snow ball method based on initial 
interviews and contacts at the ICC’s General Assembly. Th e vast 
majority of those interviewed were Inuit.
5. On the one hand, one of the raisons d’être of the Home Rule since 
1979 has been to limit the import of Danish – and later other – short 
term workers to avoid a situation where ‘Greenlanders are bystan-
ders to their own development’, as a frequently used phrase has it. 
On the other hand, Greenland has simultaneously been seeking to 
recruit skilled workers and academics to fi ll vacant positions. Th is 
issue has been high on the Greenlandic government’s agenda (see 
Jan 7, 2009 article in Politiken).
